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The German Right to Fiscal Stability and the Counter-




The PSPP litigation involved the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector 
Purchase Programme for the purchase of government bonds on the secondary market 
with the aim, among others, of combating deflation. Although the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU) found the PSPP lawful, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
disagreed: On May 5, 2020, the FCC held that the CJEU’s judgment was not binding in 
Germany and that the PSPP was unlawful and required further ECB action to bring it 
into compliance with German law.   
This article contributes to the growing scholarship on the PSPP litigation by analyzing 
the CJEU and FCC judgments as examples of what I call the ‘ordinary politics’ of 
constitutional adjudication—defending constitutional rights and principles while at the 
same time respecting the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches and 
successfully navigating the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’. Based on a careful analysis 
of the CJEU’s and FCC’s jurisprudential trajectories in the domain of economic and 
monetary policy, I argue that the FCC’s PSPP judgment is particularly counter-majoritarian. 
Over the past ten years, the FCC has fashioned, seemingly whole cloth, what I call a ‘right 
to fiscal stability’ and this right imposes additional procedural hurdles on the German 
government domestically that tip the scales in favor of EU austerity politics. My counter-
majoritarian argument applies not only to judicial interference with decisions of German 
elected officials to participate in EU bailout funds; It also applies to judicial interference 
with the bond-buying programs (eg PSPP) of European central bankers, who enjoy their 
own form of accountability and legitimacy in the EU and global financial systems. Indeed, 
because of the decline of the traditional parties of the center-right and the center-left 
and the fragmentation of the political spectrum, contemporary German politics have 
become especially vulnerable to this destabilizing, austerity-inducing effect of constitutional 
law. In response to the pandemic-induced economic crisis, there have emerged a number of 
promising policy experiments in EU-wide solidarity, supported by the German government 
as well as the vast majority of Member States. For German constitutional law to operate 
as a potential barrier to greater EU economic solidarity, above and beyond the incredibly 
contentious politics, appears to be a particularly acute form of counter-majoritarianism 
that calls for jurisprudential recalibration.   
I. Introduction 
 
 Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law 
School. 
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It is a commonplace that constitutional courts are political actors.1 That is, 
they are created to settle disputes involving the overtly political institutions of 
the jurisdiction. They do so based on the supreme law of the constitution, whose 
guarantees are generally extraordinarily open-textured. The combination of the 
type of dispute and the type of law, makes it impossible for constitutional courts 
to rely exclusively on the commonly accepted legal sources and interpretive 
techniques of their jurisdictions to reach their decisions. Rather, moral and 
political considerations also figure. The legitimacy of courts derives in large part 
from their ability to play this role and defend constitutional principles while, at 
the same time, not usurping the rightful prerogatives of other actors in the 
constitutional system, most prominently, but certainly not exclusively, the 
elected legislature. In the American tradition, the delicate task facing constitutional 
courts comes under the heading of the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’,2 in the 
French tradition, under the specter of the gouvernement des juges.3  
Beyond what one might call ordinary politics, which are common fare for 
constitutional courts in any jurisdiction, European courts are also engaged in 
another type of politics – existential politics. That is, they have been called upon 
to take sides on the issue of where the ultimate, sovereign authority lies in the 
European legal system – in the EU Treaties, as interpreted by the EU’s 
constitutional court (European Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)), or 
in Member State constitutions, as interpreted by their domestic constitutional 
courts.4 In the Anglo-American legal tradition, this can be styled as a fundamental 
debate over Europe’s rule of recognition.5 In EU law, it can simply be referred to 
as the supremacy issue. What has priority, a pronouncement of the CJEU, 
based on the EU Treaties, or a pronouncement of a Member State constitutional 
court, based on the national constitution? Similar to much of the ordinary politics 
of constitutional courts, there is no good answer in the positive law to the 
supremacy question. In many respects, this legal ambiguity is willful, and the 
EU has thrived on it. For their part, Europe’s constitutional courts have been 
quite skillful at avoiding the existential question. Yet the very possibility of discord, 
in what for all intents and purposes, appears to be a relatively well-functioning 
legal system, has driven an extensive scholarly literature on constitutional 
pluralism – seeking to explain the very existence of the system, as well as to 
develop principles rooted in moral and legal commitments to values such as 
 
1 A. Stone Sweet, ‘Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review – And Why It May Not 
Matter’ 101(8) Michigan Law Review, 2744-2780 (2003). 
2 A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 1986), 16-17.  
3 E. Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux Etats-Unis; 
l’expérience américaine du contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionalité des lois (Paris: Giard, 1921). 
4 For purposes of this article, I set aside the difference between concentrated review in a specially 
designated constitutional court and judicial review by a supreme court of general jurisdiction and 
used the term ‘constitutional court’ for both the CJEU and Member State courts.  
5 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1976). 
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pluralism and tolerance, to mediate existential conflicts should they occur.6  
For the most part, the PSPP litigation has been analyzed as an example of 
existential politics and constitutional pluralism. As will be familiar to the readers of 
this article and special issue, the PSPP litigation involved the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme for the purchase of government 
bonds on the secondary market, with the aim, among others, of combating 
deflation. The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) had doubts as to the 
lawfulness of the PSPP and referred, in July 2017, a series of questions to the 
CJEU.7 In the Weiss judgment, decided in December 2018, the CJEU gave its 
preliminary ruling, finding that the PSPP was legal under the EU Treaties in all 
respects.8 The FCC, however, disagreed, and in its judgment of 5 May 2020, 
held that the CJEU’s judgment was not binding in Germany and that the ECB’s 
PSPP was unlawful and required further action to bring it into compliance with 
German law.9  
It is not hard to understand why this quite spectacular series of judgments 
has been scrutinized for what it can reveal on the supremacy issue. The PSPP 
litigation represents a rare instance in which the existential question has resulted in 
direct conflict and where neither the CJEU nor the national court, has backed 
down. Moreover, it is the only such instance involving the German FCC, probably 
the most powerful domestically and the most prestigious internationally of 
Europe’s constitutional courts. Last, the PSPP judgment comes at a very bad 
time for the European judiciary, since the CJEU has been forced to take on a 
role in policing judicial independence and rule-of-law fundamentals in Hungary 
and Poland.10 The PSPP judgment undermines the CJEU’s legitimacy and its 
claim to supremacy. It has already been used by the governments of Poland and 
Hungary to push back against the CJEU decisions condemning them for rule-
of-law violations.11   
Although the supremacy issue is undoubtedly critical, this article contributes 
to the debate by shifting attention away from existential politics and toward the 
ordinary politics of the two constitutional courts in the PSPP litigation. The 
existential politics lens can sometimes harden positions, in favor of either EU or 
 
6 See, eg, N. Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’ 22(3) European Law Journal, 333-
355 (2016). 
7 Bundesverfassungsgericht 18 July 2017, 2 BvR 859/15 (hereinafter PSPP order), available at 
https://tinyurl.com/y6garx3q (last visited 27 December 2020). 
8 Case C-493/17 Weiss and Others (hereinafter Weiss judgment). 
9 Bundesverfassungsgericht 5 May 2020, BvR 859/15 (hereinafter PSPP judgment), available 
at https://tinyurl.com/yyprxyr7 ( last visited 27 December 2020). 
10 See F. Bignami, ‘Introduction: EU Law, Sovereignty, and Populism’, in F. Bignami ed, EU 
Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 15-
20; K. Lane Schepele and R.D. Kelemen, ‘Defending Democracy in EU Member States: Beyond 
Article 7 TEU’, in F. Bignami ed, EU Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020), chapter 15. 
11 S. Biernat, ‘How Far Is It From Warsaw to Luxembourg and Karlsruhe: The Impact of the 
PSPP Judgment on Poland’ 21(5) German Law Journal, 1104-1105 (2020). 
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Member State supremacy.12 Ordinary politics and the ever-present shadow of 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty can, instead, be a useful alternative yardstick 
for assessing constitutional judgments. Analyzing how the EU and German 
courts perform the task of applying constitutional norms while, at the same 
time, recognizing the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative and executive 
actors of their respective, and overlapping, constitutional systems, can serve as 
a helpful vantage point. A fine-grained analysis of their jurisprudence in a 
specific policy area can reveal how they exercise their powers, indicate whether 
something has gone wrong in the overall constitutional balance of powers, and 
suggest how the path can be reversed if need be.   
It can be argued that this form of counter-majoritarian analysis and self-
correction has already occurred in another EU policy area, the free movement 
of posted workers. The CJEU’s Viking and Laval judgments13 came under 
heavy criticism for their neoliberal bent and the CJEU has since signaled a shift 
towards greater tolerance for the policymaking prerogatives of the political 
branches.14 My argument in this article is that the jurisprudence of the German 
court on economic and monetary union (EMU) might be ripe for a similar form 
of recalibration. By establishing what I call a right to (EU) fiscal stability, the 
German decisional law that culminated in the PSPP judgment has tipped the 
scales in domestic, German politics in favor of Euroskeptics and against economic 
solidarity. In light of the importance of Germany in the evolving EU politics on 
EMU, the result is that the German jurisprudence has tipped the scales at the 
EU level too. Yet the German right to fiscal stability is based on constitutional 
and treaty text, and judicial precedents, that are far from unequivocal. When 
seen from the perspective of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the German 
jurisprudence on EMU has come to occupy an outsized domain in the political 
space of EMU and risks stifling legitimate German and EU debate and 
undermining the policymaking prerogatives of the other constitutional branches.   
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly 
review the PSPP litigation from the standpoint of existential politics and the 
supremacy issue. Then I turn to the ordinary politics of constitutional adjudication: 
In the third section, I analyze the evolving jurisprudence that culminated in the 
PSPP decisions of the two constitutional courts. In the fourth and concluding 
section, I suggest that the German PSPP judgment together with the earlier 
judgments on which it rests have expansively pushed the boundaries of German 
 
12 See generally V. Perju, ‘Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism’ 21(5) 
German Law Journal, 1006-1022 (2020). 
13 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet; Case C-438/05 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
OÜ Viking Line Eesti. 
14 U. Öberg and N. Leyns, ‘On Equal Treatment, Social Justice and the Introduction of 
Parliamentarism in the European Union’, in F. Bignami ed, EU Law in Populist Times: Crises and 
Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), chapter 7. 
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constitutional law. There is a good argument to be made that this EMU 
jurisprudence interferes with the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative 
and executive branches and that it might be time to scale back.  
 
  
II. Existential Judicial Politics 
Where does the ultimate legal authority in the EU system lie? Early on, in 
the well-known legal trajectory that began with Vand Gend en Loos and Costa v 
ENEL, the CJEU asserted the supremacy of EU law.15 As might be expected, 
many Member State constitutional courts have taken the opposite view, and 
have sided with their national constitutions and national law. There is also a 
third answer possible, which rests in between the absolutes – constitutional 
pluralism. This scholarly literature on the dueling supremacies of EU and 
national law dates mostly to the post-Maastricht era when the expansion of EU 
competences led to a much greater risk of head-to-head conflict between 
constitutional courts. Beyond description, the focus has been on working out a 
set of principles that can serve to mediate and accommodate the contesting 
supremacy claims of the EU’s and the Member States’ legal orders – principles 
such dialogue, subsidiarity, and participation.16    
In national constitutional courts, one important strategy for maintaining 
the supremacy of national law has been to refrain from sending questions to the 
CJEU through the preliminary reference system (Art 267 TFEU), a procedure 
that de facto recognizes the authority of the CJEU. This was the approach that 
was followed by the German FCC for decades. In 2010, however, in the 
Honeywell judgment,17 the FCC indicated a change of heart, and outlined the 
procedure by which it would request preliminary rulings under Art 267 TFEU. 
This is the procedure that it used, for only the second time, in the PSPP 
litigation. In Honeywell, the FCC first repeated the power, established in its 
Maastricht18 and Lisbon19 judgments, to review EU acts for being in breach of 
the competences contained in the EU Treaties (ultra vires review) or for 
infringing the core of German constitutional identity that cannot be assigned to 
an international organization (identity review).20 Ultra vires review, the FCC 
 
15 K.J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
16 See generally M. Avbelj and J. Komárek eds, Constitutional Pluralism in the European 
Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012).  
17 Bundesverfassungsgericht 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06 (hereinafter Honeywell judgment), 
available at https://tinyurl.com/yylaxc2a (last visited 27 December 2020). 
18 Bundesverfassungsgericht 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92, 33(2) International Legal 
Materials, 395-444 (1994) (hereinafter Maastricht judgment).  
19 Bundesverfassungsgericht 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (hereinafter Lisbon judgment), 
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6lpohk7 (last visited 27 December 2020). 
20 Honeywell judgment, para 55. 
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said, is to be coordinated with the CJEU, by giving the CJEU the first cut at the 
issue of whether the EU act is compliant with the competences set out in the 
Treaties.  
The Honeywell procedure bears some of the marks of constitutional 
pluralism. First, the FCC acknowledges the CJEU’s authority to assess EU law 
based on the higher law guarantees in the EU Treaties. Second, the FCC indicates a 
certain amount of deference to the EU legal system while nonetheless reserving 
its power in the last instance to assert its interpretation of the EU Treaties based 
on Germany’s incorporation of the EU Treaties into domestic law. This EU 
deference is articulated as an EU act being ultra vires only if the act is  
‘manifestly in violation of competences and (...) the impugned act is 
highly significant in the structure of competences between the Member 
States and the Union with regard to the principle of conferral and to the 
binding nature of the statute (the EU Treaties) under the rule of law (...)’.21  
More specifically, with reference to an act, ie judgment, of the CJEU, the FCC 
says that the judgment will be considered ultra vires only after making allowance  
‘for the Union’s own methods of justice to which the Court of Justice 
considers itself to be bound and which do justice to the ‘uniqueness’ of the 
Treaties and goals that are inherent to them (...)’.22  
Further, the CJEU ‘has a right to tolerance of error’.23 There are two types of error 
that the FCC has in mind and that will be tolerated: a doctrinally acceptable, ie 
among scholars and courts, difference in legal interpretation; or a decision with 
relatively little significance for competences or fundamental rights.     
The Honeywell framework is what was used to define the essential procedural 
and doctrinal steps of the PSPP litigation. When the ECB’s PSPP was challenged in 
a number of individual complaints before the FCC, it suspended the proceedings 
and referred the questions involving the interpretation of the PSPP and the EU 
Treaties to the CJEU. Before doing so, the FCC ascertained, following the criteria 
in the Honeywell judgment, that the ECB’s alleged violations of law would 
‘constitute a manifest and structurally significant exceeding of competences’.24 
The Court also explained, based on the CJEU’s earlier Gauweiler decision25 
involving ECB competences, why the facts of the PSPP gave rise to ‘strong 
indications that the PSPP Decision does not fall within the ECB mandate’26 and, 
 
21 Honeywell judgment, para 61. 
22 Honeywell judgment, para 66. 
23 Honeywell judgment, para 66. 
24PSPP order, para 64.  
25 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (hereinafter Gauweiler 
judgment). 
26 PSPP order, para 114. 
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if so, would constitute an ultra vires act under German constitutional law. The 
CJEU, however, disagreed and found that the ECB had acted within its mandate 
and had not exceeded its competences.   
When the case went back to the FCC, it expressly rejected the CJEU’s 
holding and asserted the supremacy of German law, resulting in the PSPP 
judgment. Again, the FCC’s analysis tracked the doctrinal framework set down 
in Honeywell. This time, there were two ultra vires EU acts – the CJEU’s 
judgment, and the ECB’s PSPP program. The CJEU’s judgment was not simply 
wrong, but manifestly and structurally significantly wrong. Its proportionality 
analysis was ‘not comprehensible from a methodological perspective’,27 ie 
manifestly wrong, and because of its failure to cabin in the PSPP program with 
proportionality, the effects for economic policy resulted in ‘a structurally 
significant shift in the order of competence to the detriment of the Member 
States’.28 As for the ECB’s PSPP, it too met the standards of manifest and 
structurally significant exceeding of competences and so it too constituted an 
ultra vires EU act.29   
This assertion of German supremacy was not the last word. In a press 
release issued three days later, the CJEU issued a rebuttal asserting EU 
supremacy:   
‘In general, it is recalled that the Court of Justice has consistently held 
that a judgment in which the Court gives a preliminary ruling is binding on 
the national court for the purposes of the decision to be given in the main 
proceedings. In order to ensure that EU law is applied uniformly, the Court 
of Justice alone – which was created for that purpose by the Member 
States – has jurisdiction to rule that an act of an EU institution is contrary 
to EU law’.30 
In short, the PSPP litigation was based on a constitutional pluralism 
framework in which, in the words of the Honeywell judgment, the inevitable 
tensions between the two constitutional courts were to be ‘harmonised 
cooperatively’ and ‘relaxed through mutual consideration’.31 In the end of the 
day, however, the result was competing declarations of supremacy.   
The existential politics of the German PSPP judgment have provoked a 
variety of reactions from the legal academy. There are a couple of different 
strands. There is a direct call for EU supremacy from some EU law scholars, 
against constitutional pluralism, or at least a version that would not allow for 
 
27 PSPP judgment, para 153. 
28 PSPP judgment, para 154. 
29 PSPP judgment, para 165. 
30 CJEU, ‘Press release following the judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 5 May 
2020,’ Press Release no 58/20, Luxembourg, 8 May 2020 (citations omitted). 
31 Honeywell judgment, para 57.  
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the FCC to declare a CJEU judgment without binding force in Germany.32 
Probably the more common response, however, is to embrace constitutional 
pluralism, and to argue for the merits or the demerits of the result that it 
produced in this particular instance. For instance, Matthias Ruffert argues that, 
in light of the scarce democratic accountability of the ECB, the FCC’s call for a 
better proportionality assessment of the economic policy effects of its bond-
buying program was sound.33 Others point to a string of legal and political 
defects that undermine the FCC’s final judgment.34   
 
 
III. Ordinary Judicial Politics 
1. Assessing the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty 
The existential judicial politics of the PSPP litigation are essential for 
appreciating both the debate in the legal scholarship and for understanding the 
procedural and doctrinal tests employed in FCC’s PSPP judgment. Now, I 
switch to the specific contribution of this article – unpacking the ordinary 
politics of the two constitutional courts and their navigation of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. To assess how the FCC and the CJEU exercised their 
constitutional functions in the concrete domain of economic and monetary 
policy, it is useful to ask how closely they stuck to the positive law. The more 
embedded in their legal sources, the less likely that constitutional adjudication 
intrudes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches, the more 
expansive their adjudication, the more likely that they trespass on the 
policymaking functions of the other branches.  
The set up for my analysis is obviously, for some perhaps painfully, naïve. 
But it is useful, particularly in the face of the technical and institutional 
complexities of the PSPP litigation. To be sure, all constitutional courts, almost 
by definition, can be accused of the counter-majoritarian difficulty.35 Furthermore, 
the use of positive law to take the gauge of the acuteness of the difficulty may 
seem like a futile exercise. Again, almost definition, constitutional courts do not 
operate with a comprehensive set of written rules or a thick body of case law but 
rather rely on an open-textured set of sources – the vague written provisions of 
their respective supreme laws, their decisional law as it has been set down from 
 
32 R.D. Kelemen et al, ‘National Courts Cannot Override CJEU Judgments: A Joint Statement 
in Defense of the EU Legal Order’ Verfassungsblog 26 May 2020, available at  
https://tinyurl.com/y6d2usgp (last visited 27 December 2020). 
33 M. Ruffert, ‘Seul un contr le credible et approfondi des fait fondant la politique de la BCE 
peut engendrer la confiance’ Le Monde, 13 May 2020. 
34 See, eg, M. Wendel, ‘Paradoxes of Ultra-Vires Review: A Critical Review of the PSPP 
Decision and Its Initial Reception’ 21(5) German Law Journal, 979-994 (2020).  
35 See generally L. Solum, ‘Legal Theory Lexicon: The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty’ Legal 
Theory Blog, 9 September 2012, available at https://tinyurl.com/y6xfuhkx (last visited 27 December 
2020). 
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case to case, and the scholarship and other writings of their legal establishments. It 
is therefore undeniable that the line between legitimate adjudication based on 
positive law and illegitimate displacement of the constitutional functions of the 
other branches is by no means self-evident. At the same time, it is possible, as I 
do here, to analyze the output of courts in a specific policy space and assess how 
closely their judgments are justified by reference to standards of legal reasoning 
or, instead, appear to tread on the policymaking prerogatives of the political 
branches.  
There is a distinctively American flavor to this concern for the counter-
majoritarian difficulty of unelected constitutional judges striking down the 
policy decisions of legislative and executive actors.36 At the same time, it is 
important not to exaggerate the difference. This yardstick for evaluating the 
judgments produced by constitutional courts is firmly rooted in republican 
theories of government and constitutional law. The powers of the French 
courts, including the constitutional court, are more limited than elsewhere 
because of the centuries-old wariness of the gouvernement des juges.37 Even in 
jurisdictions like Germany, where the suspicion of constitutional adjudication is 
decidedly less pronounced, there are numerous legal doctrines for limiting the 
power of the constitutional court vis-à-vis other constitutional bodies.38 In 
short, the notion of the need for judicial restraint in constitutional adjudication 
involving the political branches is not unique to American constitutional law 
and it is certainly known to the courts involved in the PSPP litigation. 
Now for the legal analysis: Proportionality is the legal question at the heart 
of the PSPP judgment. In its PSPP judgment, the FCC ruled against the CJEU’s 
proportionality assessment of the economic policy effects of the PSPP, adopted 
based on the EU’s competence for monetary policy. The proportionality test 
comprised the familiar three steps of (1) suitability of the PSPP for accomplishing 
the monetary policy aims; (2) necessity of the PSPP for accomplishing those 
aims; (3) balancing between the PSPP’s monetary policy benefits and its economic 
impact, to safeguard against a disproportionate burden on the economic 
competence (strict-sense proportionality). Although the FCC was generally 
critical of the CJEU’s proportionality analysis, it found greatest fault with the 
third prong of the test. It defined the economic competence that was burdened 
in the narrow, fiscal sense – the balance sheets of countries and commercial 
 
36 W. Sadurski, ‘Constitutional Review in Europe and the United States: Influences, 
Paradoxes, and Convergence’ Sydney Law School Research Paper no 11/15, 2 February 2011, 
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyah3xcd (last visited 27 December 2020).  
37 See, eg, D. Terré, ‘Le gouvernement des juges’, in Id ed, Les questions morales du droit 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), 167-191, chapter 2. 
38 See, eg, Bundesverfassungsgericht 9 February 2010, 1 BvL 1/09, available at 
https://tinyurl.com/y5bbb558 (last visited 27 December 2020), paras 133, 141 (Harz IV judgment); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 2728/13, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff on the 
Order of 14 January 2014, available at https://tinyurl.com/yyknkvfa (last visited 27 December 
2020), paras 15-23 (hereinafter OMT Order). 
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banks – and in the broader, economic and social sense – rates of return and 
risk-taking in pension plans, asset bubbles, and so on.39 This defect, following 
the doctrinal test of Honeywell, was considered manifest and structurally 
significant. The result was that the CJEU’s judgment upholding the legality of 
the PSPP was not binding in Germany and that the PSPP was in violation of the 
principle of proportionality.40 The remedy ordered was for ‘the Federal 
Government and the Bundestag to take steps seeking to ensure that the ECB 
conducts a proportionality assessment in relation to the PSPP’.41 The FCC gave 
the ECB three months to adopt a decision demonstrating the proportionality of 
the PSPP. After that time, in the absence of such a decision, the Bundesbank 
would not be permitted to participate in the bond-buying program.42  
Why did the CJEU and the FCC takes different stands on proportionality? 
For that, a detailed analysis of their legal doctrine, as it has evolved in the EMU 
area is necessary. To get a handle on the issue, one good way of focusing the 
mind is to take a step back and ask a more basic question – why should a 
proportionality assessment of an instrument of monetary policy, which no one 
doubts is at least in part designed to increase money supply and combat 
deflation, examine that instrument’s effect on economic policy? There are two 
different answers – one under EU law, the other under German law.   
 
 2. German Law  
I start with German law because that is where it all begins. Without the 
twists and turns of the German jurisprudence discussed below, it is unlikely 
that the ECB’s PSPP would have ever ended up in court, to wit the CJEU. In 
German law, a proportionality analysis of the ECB’s monetary instrument must 
take into account its economic effects because of the burden that is placed on 
what I call the ‘right to fiscal stability.’ Below I demonstrate that over the past 
decade there has developed in German constitutional law a right to (EU) fiscal 
stability. This is traceable to the FCC’s Lisbon judgment, in which the FCC said 
that parliamentary control over fiscal policy was one element of the unamendable 
core of the German Basic Law and that it was not merely a principle, but a 
fundamental right that could be litigated by individuals in the FCC. The 
converse, in German constitutional law, is that EMU has been conceptualized 
as a price and fiscal ‘stability union’,43 which essentializes the Stability and 
 
39 PSPP judgment, paras 139, 171, 172, 173. 
40 PSPP judgment, para 177. 
41 PSPP judgment, para 232. 
42 PSPP judgment, para 234. In the aftermath of the judgment, the ECB furnished (via the 
Bundesbank) the German government and Bundestag with a number of documents showing the 
considerations behind the PSPP, leading to a parliamentary decision saying that the ECB had 
shown the proportionality of the program. M. Wendel, n 34 above, 981.  
43 Stability is an extraordinarily slippery term. In the CJEU, it is used to refer to price stability 
and, in a new concept introduced in the judgment upholding the ESM, ‘the financial stability of the 
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Growth Pact, and creates a very high, German legal hurdle for any EU action 
that would loosen the austerity character of the EMU.   
The German right to fiscal stability has been developed by the FCC in a line 
of cases that began with the Lisbon judgment and then accelerated in a series of 
judgments addressing different elements of the EU’s response to the euro crisis 
– the Greek Rescue Package and the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF),44 decided in 2011, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),45 decided 
in 2014, the Outright Monetary Transactions program (OMT),46 decided in 
2016, and, now, the Public Sector Purchasing Programme (PSPP), decided on 5 
May 2020. Some even turn the clock back further, to the Maastricht judgment, 
in which the concept of stability was used to analyze and uphold Germany’s 
conferral of economic and monetary powers in the Maastricht Treaty.47 There, 
however, stability was defined primarily as price stability, ie monetary policy 
designed to avoid inflation and, in theory, deflation. The Stability and Growth 
Pact element of Maastricht Treaty figured in the judgment, but as simply one 
tool, albeit an important one, for the achievement of price stability.48 My 
account, therefore, begins with the Lisbon judgment.  
In the Lisbon judgment, the FCC said that because real, viable democracy 
was only possible at the level of the (German) state, and because democracy 
was a core and unamenable guarantee of the Basic Law (Art 20, paras 1 and 2, 
in conjunction with Art 79, para 3), there were constitutional limits on 
parliament’s ability to transfer of powers to the EU, limits which could not be 
overcome by constitutional amendment.49 The Court identified five areas as 
comprising the ‘inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the Basic 
 
euro area as a whole’. Case C-370/12 Pringle, para 142. ‘The financial stability of the euro area as a 
whole’ means the objective of preventing situations like the freezing up of the banking system, the 
exit of members from the euro area, and other types of shocks. In the FCC, by contrast, the term 
indicates price stability and fiscal stability, ie the obligation to avoid excessive deficits, in line with 
the use of the term in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance (also known as the 
Fiscal Compact). See V. Borger, ‘The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle’ 14(1) 
German Law Journal, 137-138 (2013). When the CJEU wishes to indicate the taxing and spending 
power, it does not use ‘stability’ but rather prefers ‘sound budgetary policy’, Pringle, para 143. In the 
academic literature, the taxing and spending element of EU law has been referred to as the 
‘disciplinary framework’ applicable to the Member States. M. Goldmann, ‘The European Economic 
Constitution after the PSPP Judgment: Towards Integrative Liberalism?’ 21(5) German Law Journal, 
1070 (2020).  
44 Bundesverfassungsgericht 7 September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10 (hereinafter EFSF judgment), 
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6ddj8ef (last visited 27 December 2020). 
45 Bundesverfassungsgericht 18 March 2014, 2 BvR 1390/12 (hereinafter ESM judgment), 
available at https://tinyurl.com/yddgz6m3 (last visited 27 December 2020). 
46 Bundesverfassungsgericht 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13 (hereinafter OMT judgment), 
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3843gtp (last visited 27 December 2020). 
47 See, eg, M. Ruffert, ‘The Future of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Issues of 
Constitutional Law’, in F. Bignami ed, EU Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020), 35. 
48 Maastricht judgment, paras 432, 435.  
49 Lisbon judgment, para 240. 
2020]  Short Symposium – The German Right to Fiscal Stability   638                  
Law’50 – including, critically for this analysis, ‘fundamental fiscal decisions on 
public revenue and public expenditure, the latter being particularly motivated, 
inter alia, by social policy considerations’.51 At the time, there were a number of 
criticisms that were levelled in the legal scholarship, including the dearth of 
support, historical or otherwise, for the Court’s singling out of the policy areas 
that belonged to the inviolable core.52  
Notwithstanding some of the initial skepticism with which the so-called 
‘identity lock’53 was received in the legal literature, soon thereafter the fiscal 
identity lock made its first concrete appearance. The occasion was the EFSF 
judgment.54 At issue were German fiscal transfers to the emergency rescue 
funds that were created in the early days of the EU’s sovereign debt crisis. To 
preserve German constitutional identity (and democracy) in the fiscal domain, 
the FCC held that there were both quantitative and procedural limits on 
German contributions to the EU rescue funds.55 On the issue of how much is 
too much, it was significant that the Court said that there was a limit – but ‘only 
a manifest overstepping of extreme limits is relevant’ and this had not occurred 
in the present case.56 On the procedure, the Court said that the ‘Bundestag must 
specifically approve every large-scale measure of aid of the Federal Government 
taken in a spirit of solidarity and involving public expenditure on the international 
or European Union level’ and that  
‘it must be ensured that sufficient parliamentary influence will 
continue in existence on the manner in which the funds made available are 
dealt with’.57  
 In the EFSF judgment, the FCC not only elaborated on how to preserve 
constitutional identity in the fiscal arena, but it also, for the first time, articulated 
 
50 Lisbon judgment, para 240.  
51 ibid para 252. 
52 See, eg, D. Halberstam and C. Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu 
Deutschland!” ’ 10(8) German Law Journal, 1250 (2009). 
53 P. Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’ 48(2) Common Market 
Law Review, 405 (2011). 
54 See D. Grimm et al, ‘European Constitutionalism and the German Basic Law’, in A. Albi and 
S. Bardutzky eds, National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, 
the Rule of Law: National Report (The Hague: TMC ASSER PRESS, 2019), 423-26. The authors 
explain the three types of German constitutional review of EU acts: fundamental rights, ultra vires, 
and constitutional identity, what is sometimes referred to in the legal literature as ‘identity lock’ 
review. 
55 Even though I use the term rescue funds for convenience purposes, it should be recalled that 
all of the EU economic measures discussed here are based on capital contributions from Member 
States that are used as guarantees for raising funds on the financial markets, which are then 
distributed as loans to Member States in distress. In other words, these are not direct transfers, but 
must be paid back.  
56 EFSF judgment, para 131. 
57 ibid para 128. 
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the implications of this identity lock for its emerging understanding of EMU as 
premised on EU fiscal stability:   
‘The treaty conception of the monetary union as a stability community is 
the basis and subject of the German Consent Act (German law incorporating 
Maastricht Treaty into German legal system) (...). Further central provisions 
on the design of the monetary union (beyond those on currency stability) 
also safeguard constitutional requirements of democracy in European Union 
law. In this connection, particular mention should be made of the prohibition 
of direct purchase of debt instruments of public institutions by the European 
Central Bank, the prohibition of accepting liability (bailout clause) and the 
stability criteria for sound budget management (...) Although in this connection 
the interpretation of these provisions is not essential, it is nevertheless 
possible to derive from them the fact that the independence of the national 
budgets is constituent for the present design of the monetary union (...)’.58 
In other words, German constitutional identity was preserved not simply 
by virtue of the fact that there were constitutional limitations on how much and 
through what procedure German fiscal resources could be transferred to EU 
bodies. Constitutional identity could be considered safe also because the EU 
Treaties did not admit the possibility of fiscal solidarity among Member States. 
Under the Treaties, according to the FCC, national budgets had to be independent 
and the only type of EU fiscal policy contemplated was disciplinary fiscal policy. 
Soon afterwards, the same identity lock objections were made to the ESM 
(and, directly related, the new Art 136, para 3, TFEU). In the ESM judgment, 
the FCC further articulated the constitutional identity limits on the transfer of 
budgetary powers. On the one hand, the quantitative dimension dropped out of 
view. On the other hand, the procedural dimension was reinforced: the German 
government’s participation in the ESM was conditioned on extensive Bundestag 
accountability and every new German contribution to the ESM and new 
Memorandum of Understanding setting out the terms of a bailout loan was 
conditional on Bundestag approval.59 As in the EFSF judgment, the FCC also 
took the opportunity to elaborate on the implications for the EU’s (fiscal) 
stability union. It made clear that the potential for fiscal transfers through the 
ESM was to interpreted restrictively and that there remained the (fiscal) 
‘stability-directed orientation of the monetary union’.60   
Both the EFSF and ESM cases involved the fiscal side of the EU’s response 
to the euro crisis. In the OMT and PSPP cases, the monetary side was at issue. 
Formally speaking, these cases were not constitutional identity challenges, as in 
the EFSF and ESM cases, but ultra vires challenges: the claim was that the ECB 
 
58 EFSF judgment, para 129 (emphasis added).  
59 ESM judgment, paras 135-171.  
60 ibid paras 129-134. 
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exceeded its recognized Treaty competence for monetary policy and interfered 
with the competence for economic policy.61 Technicalities aside, however, the 
German judgments in both cases were shaped by the earlier EFSF and ESM 
judgments and the emerging right to fiscal stability.   
In the OMT litigation, a number of constitutional complaints were brought 
against the ECB’s OMT program of 6 September 2012. The OMT bond-buying 
program was one of the ECB programs announced (but not actually implemented) 
to implement Mario Draghi’s famous ‘Whatever it takes’ speech from earlier 
that summer.62 The case was the first to make use of the Honeywell framework 
discussed above for obtaining a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in an ultra 
vires challenge.63 In the FCC’s order making a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU, the identity lock for fiscal policy and the corresponding EU (fiscal) stability 
union were in full view. There it expanded on the logic that was already evident 
beginning in the EFSF judgment.   
As the reader will recall, under Honeywell, for the FCC to find an EU act to 
be ultra vires, the EU act must be (1) manifestly so and (2) structurally significantly 
so. In the OMT order, the FCC found in the affirmative on both scores because 
of the identity lock and fiscal stability. First, on the requirement that the ECB’s 
OMT program be a ‘manifest’ transgression of monetary competence and an 
interference with economic competence: As it did in the EFSF passage reproduced 
above, the FCC interpreted the TFEU to preclude any economic competence 
aside from the Stability and Growth Pact, ie austerity policies.64 Admittedly, 
something might be lost in the English translation of the OMT order, but this 
formulation of EU economic policy is more categorical than the actual Treaty 
articles. Second, and tellingly, was the explanation of why an economic policy 
dimension to the ECB’s program would be structurally significant for Germany:   
(Economic policy effects would) lead to a considerable redistribution 
between the budgets and the taxpayers of the Member States and can thus 
gain effects of a system of fiscal redistribution, which is not entailed in the 
integration programme of the European Treaties. On the contrary, 
independence of the national budgets, which opposes the direct or indirect 
common liability of the Member States for government debts, is constituent 
 
61 In the cases and the EU Treaties, the economic competence is generally specified by 
reference to the fiscal component of economic policy. As will become evident later in the discussion, 
the FCC in the PSPP judgment has recently broadened its understanding to also include the effect 
that monetary policy has on interest rates, asset prices, and investment choices.  
62 Speech by M. Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment 
Conference in London, 26 July 2012, available at https://tinyurl.com/qd3hnuc (last visited 27 
December 2020). 
63 I. Pernice, ‘A Difficult Partnership between Courts: The First Preliminary Reference by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court to the CJEU’ 21(1) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 3-13 (2014). 
64 OMT order, para 39. 
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for the design of the monetary union (...).65  
In sum, because fiscal policy is at the core of German constitutional identity, EU 
monetary policy with economic policy implications that go beyond the fiscal 
stability variety would be a manifest and structurally significant transgression of 
EU competences.   
In the CJEU’s preliminary ruling, issued in the Gauweiler judgment, the 
proportionality principle surfaced for the first time, something that has since 
become the key to understanding the PSPP litigation. In the FCC’s OMT order, 
the preliminary analysis of the ECB’s bond-buying program had been based on 
a center-of-gravity test. The FCC had indicated that it believed that overall the 
OMT program fit more in the economic policy box than it did in the monetary 
policy box and hence it could potentially be ultra vires.66 The CJEU, by contrast, 
did not seek to locate the OMT program’s center of gravity. Rather, it introduced 
proportionality, and in particular the last step of strict-sense proportionality, to 
address the concern of ECB bond-buying veering into the domain of economic 
policy. This was based on the TEU’s principle of conferral (Art 4 TEU), in 
tandem with the principle of proportionality (Art 5 TEU).  
The Advocate General’s opinion is most illuminating on how German ultra 
vires review was accommodated by EU proportionality analysis. First, he 
considered the elements of the OMT program that supported the conclusion 
that it was specifically and narrowly designed to achieve monetary policy goals. 
Then, he turned to the strict-sense part of the test and weighed OMT’s 
monetary policy ‘benefits’ against the ‘costs.’ On the cost side were all of the 
dangers to EU (fiscal) stability identified in the FCC order. In the words of the 
Advocate General:  
‘it is a measure which exposes the ECB to a financial risk, together with 
the moral hazard arising from the artificial alteration of the value of the 
bonds of the State concerned’.67  
Ultimately, the Advocate General concluded in favor of proportionality. The 
CJEU followed the Advocate General – although on the strict-sense part of the 
test, in contrast with the Advocate General, the Court was vague on what the 
costs were and did not name the effect on ECB solvency and Member State 
budgetary discipline as something that was suspect.68 The CJEU therefore avoided 
entrenching in EU constitutional law the specifically German conceptualization 
of EU fiscal policy.   
 
65 OMT order, para 41. 
66 OMT order, para 69. 
67 Case C-62/14, Opinion of the Advocate General, Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher 
Bundestag, para 186. 
68 Gauweiler judgment, para 91.  
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Back in Karlsruhe, the FCC’s final OMT judgment followed the CJEU and 
decided in favor of German participation in the OMT program. In the judgment, 
however, the FCC criticized what it saw to be the CJEU’s lax judicial review.69 
The FCC got around this reservation by codifying into the OMT program the 
parameters of the proposed bond purchases that the CJEU had taken into 
account in its proportionality assessment70 – but that the CJEU did not itself 
necessarily require in the future implementation of the program should future 
circumstances change and there be other means of limiting the program.   
Before turning to the PSPP litigation, the most recent episode in this saga, it 
is necessary to cover the admissibility issue in German constitutional law, what 
can also be called standing. The vast majority of the German constitutional 
cases discussed so far have been brought through individual constitutional 
complaints based on the right to vote under Art 38, para 1 of the Basic Law. 
Ordinarily, in German law, the right to vote does not give rise to an entitlement 
to bring a constitutional complaint against decisions of parliament or other 
state bodies. It does not equate to a fundamental right to participate, via 
parliamentary representatives, in the decisionmaking process of government 
bodies; consequently, an alleged violation of the right to vote cannot be used to 
challenge their policy output. However, since the Maastricht judgment, this 
rule has been progressively relaxed in the EU context because of the perceived 
danger to democracy of transferring powers to the undemocratic EU.71 The 
right to vote has been connected to the principle of democratic self-determination 
in Art 20, paras 1 and 2.72  
Because of the expanding standard of admissibility, individuals can now 
challenge EU acts in both constitutional identity review and ultra vires review. 
So far, the principal example of such litigation has been the EMU cases canvassed 
in this article. Calling something a ‘fundamental right’ has implications not only 
for court access, but also affects the substantive analysis of how (and how 
much) that ‘fundamental right’ can be used to push back against government 
action. It is because of both the court-access and substantive elements of how 
German constitutional law has evolved in the EMU domain that this article 
speaks of a ‘right’ to fiscal stability. The German right gives the democracy 
principle very significant constitutional bite in the EU arena as compared to the 
ordinary reach of the principle in German constitutional law on strictly national 
issues.  
And so we arrive at the PSPP litigation. The FCC’s initial order requesting a 
preliminary ruling largely tracked the reasoning of its earlier OMT order, just 
applied to the ECB’s new PSPP. For the same reasons relating to the identity 
 
69 OMT judgment, para 181.  
70 OMT judgment, para 190 (CJEU’s parameters are ‘legally binding’).  
71 EFSF judgment, paras 100-102; OMT order (Justice Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting), paras 15-23. 
72 See I. Feichtner, ‘The German Constitutional Court’s PSPP Judgment: Impediment and 
Impetus for the Democratization of Europe’ 21(5) German Law Journal, 1092 (2020). 
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lock over fiscal policy and the right to fiscal stability, it found that if the PSPP 
were held ultra vires, this would be a ‘manifest and structurally significant 
exceeding of competences.’73 The FCC also conducted a preliminary assessment 
on the PSPP’s impact on economic policy. The Court pointed to the economic 
policy effects of the ECB’s massive bond buying program:  
‘Member states can deliberately use low-yield government bonds as a 
means of budgetary policy’ and ‘the activities of commercial banks are 
factually subsidized.’74  
Such effects, in its view ‘could prove to be disproportionate in relation to the 
legitimate monetary policy objectives pursued.’75  
As explained in the introduction, the CJEU responded to the FCC’s 
preliminary reference in the Weiss judgment and found the PSPP to be legal. 
For the time being, the specifics of the Weiss judgment are bracketed, and will 
be covered in the next section. The focus here is on how the German right to 
fiscal stability led the FCC to reject the CJEU’s proportionality analysis when 
the case went back to Karlsruhe.   
First, in the PSPP judgment, the FCC requires that there be a hard line 
drawn between monetary policy and economic policy so that the impact of the 
bond-buying program on economic policy, ie the burden on the German right 
to fiscal stability, can be assessed.76 There is an implicit on-off switch in the 
PSPP judgment – exclusive EU competence for monetary policy, virtually no 
competence for economic policy. This is coherent from the standpoint of the 
German decisional law canvassed earlier in this section. However, from the 
perspective of the system of competences in the EU Treaties, it is far from 
evident that such a hard line can be drawn. That is why the FCC itself waivers in 
how it characterizes EU power over economic policy – from something that ‘in 
principle remains a competence of the Member States’,77 to ‘limited conferral 
upon the EU of the competence to coordinate general economic policies, with 
the Member States retaining the competence for economic policy at large’,78 to 
the assertion that, even though it might not be possible to say exactly how, 
economic policy must be different from monetary policy since ‘the Union only 
has an exclusive competence for monetary policy (but not for the matters of 
economic policy)’.79  
The fact is that the EU does has extensive power over economic policy – 
although, to date, it has been economic policy of the austerity variety, which has 
 
73 PSPP order, para 64-68. 
74 ibid para 122. 
75 ibid para 122. 
76 PSPP judgment, para 127. 
77 ibid para 120.  
78 ibid para 127.  
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been applied through the European Semester and which has legal and political 
bite mostly in debtor Member States.80 When the FCC says that ECB monetary 
policy should not have effects on economic policy, it has in mind a specific type 
of economic policy more in line with Keynesian ideas. The austerity variety of 
economic policy, by contrast, is fully in line with, and indeed required by, the 
concept of (fiscal) stability union that we saw in the EFSF judgment, the ESM 
judgment, the OMT order, and the PSPP order. At the EU level, however, it is 
hard to see how a general competence analysis can draw a strict line between 
the two types of economic policy. To be sure, there are the specific Treaty 
provisions that the FCC relied on to develop its concept of (fiscal) stability union 
– the provisions that serve as the basis for the European Semester (Art 121 
TFEU), that establish the Excess Deficit Procedure (Art 126 TFEU), that bar 
ECB financing of national debt (Art 123 TFEU), and that prevent the EU and 
Member States from assuming liability for the debt of other Member States (Art 
124 TFEU). But to draw the conclusion, based on these specific Treaty articles, 
that all other types of EU economic policy are precluded, is an interpretive 
stretch. It is neither dictated by the Treaty text, nor, to the extent that original 
meaning serves as an interpretive tool in EU law, the intent of all the Treaty 
signatories. 
Second, in the PSPP judgment, the FCC requires that the proportionality 
test include a full-fledged, strict-sense third step and directs the ECB to furnish 
one. In the proportionality principle, regardless of whether German or EU law 
is in play, a full-blown analysis on the third step is generally reserved for 
important rights or interests that could potentially outweigh what has already 
been established to be a legitimate and essential public policy measure.81 Under 
EU law it is not immediately apparent what that important right or interest 
would be. But it is under German law – the right to fiscal stability. According to 
the FCC, on the third step, the economic policy effects, ie the burden on the 
German right to fiscal stability, must be fully assessed.82 The assessment of the 
economic policy burden should be broad-ranging – not just the impact on the 
debt burden and fiscal liability of governments, but also more generally on 
social and economic policy. And this economic policy burden must be balanced 
against the monetary policy benefits of combating deflation.   
Certain commentators have taken the FCC’s broad definition of economic 
policy to be a promising sign that the FCC is moving away from a purely austerity-
 
80 See P. Tsoukala, ‘Post-Crisis Economic and Social Policy: Some Thoughts on Structural 
Reforms 2.0’, in F. Bignami ed, EU Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020), chapter 3. 
81 See generally R. Stacey, ‘The Magnetism of Moral Reasoning and the Principle of 
Proportionality in Comparative Constitutional Adjudication’ 67(2) American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 435-476 (2019).  
82 PSPP judgment, para 139.  
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oriented vision of monetary union.83 It should be noted, however, that this 
more comprehensive balancing, which looks not just at the incentives to run 
high budget deficits, but also at the effect of low interest rates on different types 
of investments, is done by necessity from Germany’s perspective. What do low 
or indeed negative interest rates do to the savings of German pensioners? To 
the prices of real estate in Berlin? And so on. This national perspective is still in 
tension with an EU-wide economic and monetary policy, which might, say, 
sacrifice returns on pensioner savings in one country, in order to protect the 
solvency of governments (and their public pensions plans) in another country. 
In fact, the broader articulation of economic policy in the PSPP judgment can 
be said to draw on the logic of the identity lock for fiscal policy. The Lisbon 
judgment singled out the social, redistributive dimension of fiscal policy as 
something that had to remain within the prerogatives of the German parliament 
and German voters. By requiring that the ECB provide a full statement of the 
economic consequences of monetary policy to the German government and 
parliament, the ECB’s social and economic trade offs are squarely put in the 
accountability ambit of German voters and their representatives.  
Third, in the PSPP judgment, the FCC calls for ‘full judicial review’ of the 
impact of the ECB’s bond-buying program on economic policy.84 This standard 
is required because it is  
‘imperative that the mandate of the ESCB [European System of 
Central Banks] be subject to strict limitations given that the ECB and the 
national central banks are independent institutions which means that they 
operate on the basis of a diminished level of democratic legitimation’.85   
Here, the FCC repeats directly parts of its previous OMT judgment in which is 
was skeptical of the CJEU’s light-touched review of the earlier OMT program.86 
Again, from the perspective of EU law, it is not self-evident that the ECB 
should be subject to stringent judicial review, since it can be characterized as a 
both a constitutional body – since it is created by the primary law of the EU 
Treaties – and a technical or administrative body – since its legitimacy derives 
in large part from the fact that it possesses the economic expertise necessary for 
monetary policy. Even under German law, it is not immediately apparent why a 
constitutionally established authority with responsibility for managing a 
technocratic policy area should be subject to a tough standard of review. There 
are many examples in German law of relatively independent and technocratic 
administrative bodies that are subject to deferential standards of review.87 The 
 
83 M. Goldmann, n 43 above, 1075. 
84 PSPP judgment, para 143. 
85 ibid para 143 (citations omitted). 
86 OMT judgment, paras 183-89.  
87 See, eg, Bundesverfassungsgericht 12 November 2008, BvR 2456/06 (deference to nuclear 
2020]  Short Symposium – The German Right to Fiscal Stability   646                  
most on point, however, is the Bundesbank before the ECB was established. It 
was highly independent (albeit as set down by parliamentary law, not expressly 
guaranteed in the Basic Law) and its policy decisions largely escaped 
constitutional control.88   
As with the rigid separation between monetary and economic policy and 
the strict-sense prong of proportionality, the answer to the question ‘why 
stringent review’ is to be found in the right to fiscal stability. In the German legal 
theory known as essentialness (Wesentlichkeitslehre), the legislative delegation of 
power to an administrative body is especially suspicious when a fundamental 
right might be affected by the exercise of that power.89 The Parliament is 
required to carefully set out the content, purpose, and scope of the powers 
conferred and the courts are to hold administrative bodies to that standard. In 
addition, as explained earlier, the ability of individuals to litigate constitutional 
complaints against administrative bodies turns on the violation of a 
fundamental right – which now exists in the economic policy domain. Before 
the jurisprudential trajectory that began with the Lisbon judgment, central 
bank operations were not conceived as affecting fundamental rights because the 
effect on the right to property – the right most obviously impacted by potentially 
inflationary policies – was considered too remote.90 Now that there is the right 
to fiscal stability, the ECB does not enjoy the same freedom from judicial review 
as did Germany’s central bankers in earlier days. It is important to note that 
what drives the ‘full judicial review’ standard for the ECB is the right to democratic 
self-determination over fiscal matters, not the right to democratic self-
determination tout court. Hence the democratizing impetus of this jurisprudence 
is secondary to the underlying suspicion of EU fiscal policy.91 There are plenty 
of highly independent authorities in the EU system, but they have not, or at 
least not yet, been singled out for stringent judicial review, because they do not 
operate in the identity lock arena of fiscal policy.   
 
 3.  EU Law 
I now turn to CJEU’s Weiss judgment. To the frame the analysis, I ask the 
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same question as in the previous section on Germany: Why, under EU law, 
should a proportionality assessment of an instrument of monetary policy examine 
that instrument’s effect on economic policy? The positive law background for 
the case is not simply the earlier Gauweiler judgment, narrated in the previous 
section, in which the CJEU upheld the OMT program. It is also the EU law on 
judicial review of EU acts generally speaking, outside of the context of an ultra 
vires challenge to an ECB act. Typically under EU law, and different from the 
German constitutional analysis, competence and proportionality are separate 
grounds for challenging the validity of an EU act like the PSPP. In the legal 
analysis, first comes competence, then proportionality. This doctrinal scheme is 
a product of the longstanding framework for judicial review of the validity of EU 
acts contained in Art 263 TFEU. It is also used in adjudicating the more recent 
principles of conferral and proportionality, first recognized by the Maastricht 
Treaty (Art 3b EC Treaty) and since elaborated in the Lisbon Treaty (Arts 4 and 
5 TEU).  
Under EU law, the issue of competence is address by examining whether 
the Treaty provision offered as the legal basis for the act is the proper legal basis. 
Most often, the litigant challenges the act on the grounds that an alternative Treaty 
provision and policy objective was applicable-generally a Treaty provision that 
requires unanimity voting in the Council and therefore one that would stymie 
action or a Treaty provision that bars the type of act adopted. Very often such 
litigation involves internal market acts, since the mandate for internal market 
harmonization is quite broad and involves qualified majority voting in the 
Council, unlike Treaty provisions in other policy areas that can specifically bar 
certain types of measures and that can impose significant procedural hurdles to 
adopting EU acts. The CJEU examines whether the EU’s asserted legal basis is 
supported by the reasons listed in the act’s preamble, by the content of the act, 
by the plausibility (or implausibility) of the connection between objectives and 
content, and, sometimes, by additional material produced in the litigation.92 
The Court generally does not examine the plausibility of the alternative policy 
objective and Treaty provision, even in those cases where there is a claim that 
the EU institution’s choice of legal basis was designed to circumvent a prohibition 
on action contained in another Treaty provision.93 When examining the EU’s 
asserted legal basis, there is no deference, since assessing whether there is a 
mandate for action is a pure legal question of interpretation of the Treaty.    
In the EU law of judicial review, the competence analysis, also known as 
legal basis analysis, may be followed by a proportionality test. This test mirrors 
the proportionality test that has been used for ECB bond-buying programs. The 
 
92 See, eg, Case C-84/94, UK v Council, para 25; Case C-217/04, UK v European Parliament 
and Council, para 42; Case 317/04, European Parliament v Council, paras 67-69; Case C-270/12, 
UK v European Parliament and Council, para 113; Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament 
and Council, paras 31-70.  
93 See, eg, Case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council, paras 79, 85. 
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CJEU sometimes follows a two-part scheme (appropriate and necessary), but 
other times also includes a strict-sense step involving balancing and the 
requirement that ‘disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the 
aims pursued.’94 When applying this proportionality test to assess the validity of 
EU acts, the CJEU generally employs the deferential ‘manifest error’ standard 
of review.95 
The Weiss judgment follows this classic sequence of first scrutinizing the 
legal basis of the PSPP and then analyzing its proportionality.96 The CJEU 
examines the monetary policy legal basis offered by the ECB. Based on the 
enumeration of exclusive competences in Art 3 TFEU and the text contained in 
the specific provisions of the TFEU’s Title on Economic and Monetary Policy, 
the CJEU concludes that: 
the primary objective of the Union’s monetary policy is to maintain 
price stability. The same provisions further stipulate that, without prejudice to 
that objective, the ECSB is to support the general economic policies in the 
Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of its objectives, as 
laid down in Art 3 TEU.97 
Thus we see that there is no categorical separation of monetary and 
economic policy, as the FCC says there should be. There is also no bar on ECB 
measures aimed at price stability also having indirect effects on economic 
policy, and in particular, economic policy of the non-austerity variety.98 But that 
is because the Treaty text does not contain such a bar, with the exception of Art 
123 TFEU prohibiting ECB purchasing of government debt, which the CJEU 
takes up in a separate portion of the judgment. In short, the CJEU declines to 
take up the FCC’s invitation to construe EMU as a (fiscal) stability union. Rather, it 
takes a more open-ended view, as seems appropriate for the EU Treaties, which 
were signed by the nineteen members of the euro area, and which contain a 
number of ambiguities as to the exact scope of monetary and economic 
competences.   
To conclude the competence analysis, the CJEU goes on to examine the 
specifics of the PSPP. It finds that the aims and the substance of the program 
come within the monetary policy competence. The Court examines the reasons 
contained in the ECB act to ascertain that it pursues the aim of combating 
deflation and maintaining an inflation rate at around two percent. It also finds 
that the purchase of government bonds on secondary markets is a permissible 
means for accomplishing this end. On this competence step of the analysis, 
 
94 See, eg, Case C-331/88, Fedesa, para 13. 
95 Fedesa, paras 15, 16 
96 Weiss judgment, paras 46-70 (competence), paras 71-100 (proportionality). 
97 ibid para 51.  
98 ibid paras 60, 66. 
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there is no deference to the ECB. 
The CJEU then takes up the proportionality issue and analyzes the 
appropriateness and necessity of the measure, as well as the potential 
disproportionate disadvantages, ie strict-sense proportionality.99 In the interest 
of space, I jump straight to the issue of disproportionate disadvantages, since 
that is the main bone of contention between the two constitutional courts. On 
this score, the CJEU relies both on the minutes of ECB Governing Council 
meetings, incorporating by reference the Advocate General’s discussion, and 
the reasons and requirements contained in the ECB act. The main disadvantage 
that it considers is the financial exposure of participating central banks and 
Member States in the event of default on the government bonds held by the 
ECB.100 Based on the PSPP requirements that limit the liability of Member 
State central banks for defaults on debt issued by other Member States, the 
CJEU finds that exposure is adequately limited and therefore the burdens do 
not outweigh the benefits to price stability.   
The Weiss judgment’s strict-sense step is fully in line with how the CJEU 
does proportionality balancing of policy objectives against countervailing economic 
interests in other cases. The closest analogue is when an EU act aimed at 
environmental protection or market harmonization is challenged based on the 
economic burdens for market actors in one of the Member States. The Court 
generally checks that the EU act is tailored to the policy objective, and then lets 
it pass.101 Of course, the FCC’s PSPP judgment shows how inadequate this 
analogue is under German constitutional law – the German right to fiscal 
stability is far weightier than the economic interests of market actors. Further, 
as the PSPP judgment makes clear, the German right to fiscal stability is aimed 
not only at avoiding financial liability, but also includes interests such as sound 
budgetary policy in other Member States, interest rates for savers and pensioners, 
and guarding against potential asset bubbles. However, under the generally 
applicable standards of EU law, it is difficult to make the case for treating the 
PSPP’s economic implications for one Member State as categorically different 
from the economic burdens that all Member States experience, at one time or 
the other, because of common EU policies.  
The last thing to note about the CJEU’s proportionality analysis is that it 
applies the familiar ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard. The rationale for 
this standard is linked to the technical expertise of monetary institutions.102 
This discretion afforded to the ECB is completely in line with other litigation 
that has challenged ECB acts in the CJEU.103 It is also in line with CJEU 
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proportionality review of EU acts in a variety of other policy areas. Take one – 
environmental law. There, the manifest error standard is applied to the 
(independent) Commission104 and to the (political) Council.105 Again, the manifest 
error standard does not live up to the FCC’s call for more rigorous review of the 
independent ECB. But again, under EU law, it is hard to discern any principled 
ground for singling out the ECB for stricter judicial review. There are hundreds 
of public bodies operating in the EU system, all with greater or lesser 
independence from Member State governments and the EU institutions. Their 
policy determinations are generally subject to proportionality review based on 
the manifest error standard. To treat the ECB any different would, from the 
perspective of EU law, be highly problematic and could itself give rise to a claim 
of unfounded and lawless adjudication by the CJEU.   
 
 
IV. The FCC’s Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty 
It is time to return to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. How has the EMU 
jurisprudence of the two constitutional courts evolved and how are their 
respective judgments in the PSPP litigation situated in that jurisprudence? How 
closely do the two courts adhere to their constitutional law sources and, 
conversely, how ready have they been to push the boundaries of those sources 
and occupy the policymaking space allocated to the political branches in their 
overlapping constitutional systems? The answer to these questions can help 
evaluate how the two courts have navigated the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
and the ordinary politics of constitutional adjudication.  
First the CJEU: Its approach in the Weiss judgment to judicial review of the 
ECB and the PSPP might strike some as light-touched. Yet this approach is 
squarely within the bounds of its Treaty text and its precedents. The way in 
which the Court unpacks the legal grounds of competence and proportionality 
is extraordinarily familiar from its many decades of judicial review of EU acts, 
both ECB and acts adopted by other EU bodies. The standards of review the 
Court used to assess the competence and proportionality challenges – no 
deference on competence and manifest error for proportionality – are also 
consistent with decades of CJEU decisional law. In Weiss, the CJEU performs 
in classic fashion its constitutional function of policing the boundaries laid down in 
the Treaties and allocating prerogatives as between the different institutional 
and Member State actors. 
By contrast, the previous section brings to light the expansive nature of 
German constitutional adjudication. The FCC’s bold legal trajectory took just 
over ten years to culminate in the PSPP judgment – from the Lisbon judgment’s 
 
104 See, eg, Case T-614/13, Romonta GmbH v European Commission, para 63. 
105 See, eg, Case C-86/03, Greece v Commission, para 88. 
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identity lock for fiscal policy, to the EFSF’s concept of EMU as a fiscal stability 
union, to the line of cases working out how to safeguard the identity lock and 
the corresponding right to fiscal stability in the ESM judgment and the 
(technically speaking, ultra vires review) OMT and PSPP judgments. It might be 
true that the challenge to German democracy from European integration is 
unprecedented. The response, however, has been to fashion constitutional 
rights and remedies seemingly whole cloth, without being able to rely on much 
by way of conventional legal sources.  
In light of this willingness to push the boundaries of German constitutional 
law, it is fair to ask how acute the counter-majority difficulty has been. How 
have the FCC’s judgments affected the politics of the eurozone and the 
constitutional prerogatives of the other branches of government? The Lisbon 
and EFSF judgments undoubtedly strengthened Germany’s hand in framing 
the EU response to the euro crisis as bailouts in return for austerity. The 
ratcheting up of the disciplinary aspect of EMU in the first two years of the euro 
crisis, culminating in the Fiscal Compact (Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and 
Governance), bears the unmistakable imprint of the German constitutional 
jurisprudence.106 As Nicolas Jabko relates, EU leaders  
‘continued to stress its (the Treaty’s) ‘no bail out’ provisions – as the 
German chancellor needed to cover herself from adverse rulings by the 
sovereignty-conscious German constitutional court’.107  
As for monetary policy and the ECB’s bond-buying programs, it is widely 
known that top Bundesbank officials and the German member of the Executive 
Board were opposed to quantitative easing. At least in part, the considerable lag 
between the US Federal Reserve’s adoption of quantitative easing and the 
ECB’s adoption of similar policies can be put down to resistance from German 
central bankers.108 While German economic thinking on price stability is 
separate from the law, the fact is that elements of the economic orthodoxy were 
transferred to the legal design of EMU and this law, as it played out in the FCC’s 
jurisprudence, was used to influence ECB policy.109 The aftermath of Draghi’s 
‘Whatever it takes’ speech vividly illustrates this point: when the Bundesbank 
lost in the ECB, and the OMT program was announced, it got a second chance 
to press for stability before the sympathetic FCC in the OMT litigation.110  
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Not only does the German jurisprudence impact EU politics, but it also tips 
the scales internally, in German politics. In the EMU cases, many of the 
individual complainants have been members of anti-European political parties 
or party wings.111 More to the point, the constitutional standards set down in 
the judgments tip the balance in German political debates towards an austerity 
version of EMU. The procedural restrictions on fiscal transfers and the suspicion of 
the ECB’s bond-buying activities are unquestionably outcomes that limit EU 
lending and increase national debt burdens. From a political perspective, it does 
not come as a surprise that the German legislature and executive would favor 
limiting intra-EU fiscal transfers and that they would support conditionality. It 
does not come as a surprise that they might prefer higher interest rates for German 
pension plans, even though the consequence might be a more punishing debt 
burden for other Member States. But it does seem strange that a constitutional 
court would entrench this position as a higher law, constitutional baseline 
based on the aggressive jurisprudential trajectory chronicled in this article.  
The constitutionalization of EU fiscal stability makes it much harder for 
German political parties and their voters to move away from austerity, towards 
solidarity, if the circumstances change and their elected leaders come to view it 
in Germany’s best interests. A sympathetic view of the constitutional jurisprudence 
on the right to fiscal stability and the identity lock might point to the fact that it 
only requires procedure, not substance – parliamentary participation, not austerity. 
In important respects, however, process can dictate outcome. The prospect of 
repeated constitutional litigation, repeated parliamentary votes, and repeated 
parliamentary scrutiny can easily derail an emerging consensus in such a 
sensitive policy area. It is also necessary to keep in mind the decline of the 
traditional parties of the center-right and the center-left and the fragmentation 
of the political spectrum. This development renders contemporary German politics 
especially vulnerable to the destabilizing effect of the FCC’s EMU jurisprudence.    
One possible retort to the counter-majoritarian critique is that it doesn’t 
apply to the German judgments on the OMT and the PSPP. After all, unlike the 
German government that was involved in deciding on euro crisis bailout funds, 
the ECB is specifically designed to be counter-majoritarian – independent of 
elected officials. Still, the ECB is more accountable than the German constitutional 
court, and accountable in a way that contributes to making good monetary 
policy. The ECB is the object of a diffuse form of accountability involving many 
important players, elected and unelected, in the EU and global financial systems.112 
It is embedded in financial policymaking networks that are comprised of a mix 
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of technocratic economists and politically accountable personnel from finance 
ministries. To go back to the ECB’s first foray into unconventional monetary 
policy, Draghi’s July 2012 speech and the OMT program that was subsequently 
announced, it is difficult to believe that there weren’t strong political signals giving 
the green light for the change in ECB policy. Moreover, the ECB is emmeshed in 
global networks of central bankers that are critical to its success as one of the 
central players in global financial markets. In short, the ECB enjoys a distinct form 
of accountability and legitimacy that deserves consideration in a counter-
majoritarian analysis – and therefore deference from a constitutional court.  
The EU’s response to the coronavirus crisis will be the next test of the 
German right to fiscal stability and the FCC’s counter-majoritarian difficulty. 
Compared to the euro crisis, the EU response has been remarkably swift. On 
the monetary side, the policy is consistent with earlier developments. The ECB 
has undertaken yet another massive bond-buying program, called the 
Pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP). On economic policy, by 
contrast, there are signs of departure from the disciplinary aspects of the euro 
crisis years. The proposed Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, 
which is being finalized as this goes to press, will be nearly double of what it was 
in the last MFF cycle, and will include a euro 750 billion Recovery Plan. Unlike 
the ESM, more than half of the Recovery Plan (euro 390 billion) will be grants 
and even though grants and loans will be tied to conditions, it will not be the 
same discipline-driven conditions of ESM loans. Additionally, part of the 
funding will come from new EU own resources, meaning that the EU will have 
new direct revenue-raising powers in addition to customs duties – the Financial 
Transaction Tax and revenue from the Emissions Trading System. Both the 
PEPP and the Recovery Plan will raise significant issues under the German 
constitutional law that has been discussed in this article: the PEPP could 
potentially trigger many of the same objections as the PSPP; the Recovery Plan 
will add a new twist to German constitutional scrutiny because of the outright 
fiscal transfers, the looser conditionality, and the new revenue-raising powers.  
The nature and the speed of the EU’s response to the current economic 
crisis are promising signs of solidarity in response to the commonly experienced 
catastrophe of the pandemic. Yet all of these elements of EU coronavirus policy 
have implications for the German identity lock for fiscal policy and the right to 
fiscal stability. It appears misplaced, to say the least, for German constitutional 
law to operate as a hurdle to these experiments in greater solidarity, above and 
beyond the incredibly contentious EU politics that have always operated as a 
barrier to greater integration in economic and distributive matters. Should the 
German government, together with the vast majority of other Member State 
governments, decide that a more robust, EU economic policy is necessary for 
EU prosperity and security, which of course is essential to German prosperity 
and security, then it would seem that constitutional law’s rightful role is limited. 
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Without greater judicial deference to the calculations of the political branches 
as to what type of economic policy is best for social stability and security, there 
is the risk of a particularly acute counter-majoritarian difficulty.  
In any area of law, the process of reconsidering and recalibrating the 
jurisprudence of courts must begin somewhere. On this point it seems fitting to 
conclude with one of the dissenting opinions from the decision to take the OMT 
case. There, Justice Lübbe-Wolff said:  
‘That some few independent German judges – invoking the German 
interpretation of the principle of democracy, the limits of admissible 
competences of the ECB following from this interpretation, and our 
reading of Art. 123 et seq TFEU – make a decision with incalculable 
consequences for the operating currency of the euro zone and the national 
economies depending on it appears as an anomaly of questionable 
democratic character.’113 
Together with other forms of legal reflection, her dissent might serve as a 
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